This paper analyzes the investment timing for team projects. Under demand uncertainty, it is valuable to maintain flexibility in future investment alternatives. However, one party's flexibility creates strategic uncertainty for another party, which causes the other party to choose a higher level of flexibility. This strategic complementarity leads to delays in investments in contrast to the case of accelerated investments for preemption. This strategic effect is also distinct from the free-rider problem because this study focuses on the second moment of payoffs. The model also provides a rational alternative to the status-quo bias in organizational decision-making.
Introduction
Investments in a strategic environment is often studied in the context of preemption and entry deterrence. The standard result is that investments are accelerated in such strategic environments because early investments can limit competition by deterring potential entries (Dixit, 1979; Bulow et al., 1985a; Spencer and Brander, 1992; Allen et al., 2000) . However, we often observe delays in team projects such as joint ventures and strategic alliances (Inkpen and Ross, 1998; Ertel and Gordon, 2007) . For example, an alliance of a real estate developer and a redevelopment authority makes slow progress when both parties maintain many options to choose from. Alternatively, an alliance of firms for research and development tends to delay investments when each firm perceives uncertainty in partners' actions. Team projects are an essential element of an economy at all levels; e.g., a multi-divisional company, projectbased labor contract, task force, joint venture, and public private partnership.
In this paper, I study the investment timing when two agents (e.g., firms) form a team to make joint investments. The initial agreement does not fully specify all state-contingent plans because of a high cost of writing a complete contract. Instead, as a common practice, the firms narrow down the action space by agreeing on a list of possible investment alternatives.
In the terminology used by Hart and Moore (2004) , firms "rule out". For example, a new computer product is often developed by an alliance of hardware and software firms. A hardware firm may consider improving graphics or a motion-detection function, but won't consider all possible improvements. Similarly, a real estate developer may consider a hotel or office, but won't consider all possible property types. After forming a team, the firms choose the best alternative and timing for investments while project values evolve stochastically.
The team does not face a perfect competition with other teams and thus, the option to wait has a positive value (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Abel et al., 1996; Grenadier, 2002) .
This investment decision is strategic because one firm's choice of an investment alternative influences the payoff to the other firm through synergies. Firms make investment decisions by taking into consideration both exogenous demand uncertainty and a strategic effect.
I show that, in equilibrium, firms maintain greater flexibility in the initial list of investment alternatives and delay invest in this strategic environment than in a single entity environment even if the expected payoff is unchanged. A key insight is that more flexible plans for a firm create greater strategic uncertainty to the other firm because of the existence of multiple equilibria or changes in the equilibrium structure of the game. Given greater uncertainty, the other firm chooses as the best response a higher degree of flexibility in its initial list as Jones and Ostroy (1984) and Appelbaum and Lim (1985) demonstrate.
Thus, the flexibility in investment alternatives is a strategic complement as defined by Bulow et al. (1985b) . With this stratetgic complementarity, a positive feedback is created between flexibility and uncertainty. In equilibrium, uncertainty is greater and investments are delayed as a consequence of the maximization of firm value. This result based on the second moment of payoffs is contrasted with other results based on the first moment such as the war of attrition, the holdup problem (Che and Sakovics, 2004) , the second-mover advantage in a sequential-move game (Chamley and Gale, 1994) , and synchronization in a coordination game (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 1992; Cahuc and Kempf, 1997; Gale, 1995 Gale, , 1996 .
The delay in investments relative to the non-strategic case has an important implication.
In an economy in which public private partnerships and joint ventures are widely used, investment activities can be stagnant even if the demand level is high and the demand uncertainty is low. The delay in investment also serves as a basis for a status-quo bias for a multi-divisional organization when the investment in this study is interpreted as a commitment for a change.
Specifically, I derive a perfect Nash equilibrium of a two-stage game, which embeds a continuous-time option model of investment in the second stage. In the second stage, the firms optimally exercise American call options on the basis of equilibrium payoffs, which are modeled as a jump-diffusion process. A geometric Wiener process represents stochastic demand and a Poisson process represents changing equilibrium structures. In the next section, I demonstrate that the equilibrium payoff exhibits jumps when the equilibrium structure of a product choice game changes.
In the first stage, the firms decide how many investment alternatives to include in the agreement. Maintaining multiple alternatives gives a firm flexibility to choose the best alternative later. A firm increases the number of alternatives until the additional value is greater than the additional cost of maintaining multiple alternatives.
An Illustration of Strategic Uncertainty
To demonstrate that strategic uncertainty can emerge as a result of changing equilibrium structures or multiple equilibria, I consider two firms that already formed a team. Each firm maintains two alternative product characteristics and determines the best alternative at each t by a simultaneous-move, non-repeated, non-cooperative game.
1 For example, an alliance of a computer hardware and software firms considers a better motion-detection technology or a better graphics. Although a good match between hardware and software will create synergies, the firms may not agree on the same alternative. multiplied by a synergy ratio, which follows an AR(1) process around the value of one. 2 I report an equilibrium with the following priority: 1. a unique equilibrium, 2. the risk-dominant equilibrium among Pareto-ordered multiple equilibria (e.g., Carlsson and van Damme, 1993, demonstrate its robustness.), and 3. a realization of the mixed strategy equilibrium among non-Pareto-ordered multiple equilibria.
The equilibrium outcome exhibits jumps when the equilibrium structure changes from, say, Prisoners' Dilemma to the Battle of the Sexes. Jumps also occur when the players or they cannot eliminate Pareto-dominated equilibria (e.g., see Crawford, 1995 , for a Pure Coordination Game). 3 For example, Firm A's value exhibits jumps from 1.15 to 1.53 at t = 13 and from 1.46 to 1.12 at t = 17. Firm A's equilibrium choices change between two types at times 2, 3, 12, 13, 30, 31, and 32, and Firm B's choices change at times 7, 9, 17, 22, 23, and 25.
The Model and Results
Two risk-neutral firms, labeled i ∈ {A, B}, form a team for joint investments. The team does not face a perfect competition for the investment opportunity and thus, an option to wait has a positive value. There are two phases: an initial phase of team formation and the second phase of investments. In the initial team formation phase, firms agree on a list of investment alternatives that can be carried out in the investment phase, but they cannot contract on every potential contingency; i.e., the contract is incomplete. Firms could narrow the list down to a single alternative, but it is not optimal because an initially optimal alternative may turn out to be ex-post suboptimal due to exogenous demand uncertainty.
The number of alternatives is a measure of flexibility of the project. It is a discrete number in principle, but for analytical convenience, I formulate the flexibility as a contin-
Maintaining more alternatives increases the firm's ability to react to changes in market conditions, but incurs costs L i to keep all alternatives up-to-date (e.g., expenses for planning, feasibility studies, and regulatory processes). L i is assumed to be an increasing convex function of
The firms determine F A and F B in the initial agreement at time t = 0, and make their investments by the end of the investment phase, time T .
In the investment phase, the fundamental value of an alternative k evolves as a geometric
Wiener process on a filtered probability space (Ω, F, P ), with filtration
The value process is expressed as: dV i . It is important to note thatV i,t is non-decreasing in F i because adding more alternatives won't harm:
In addition to the fundamental value, firm i's payoff is influenced by the strategic uncertainty that stems from a game with firm j. As illustrated in Section 2, payoffs exhibit infrequent jumps due to changing equilibrium structures or the existence of multiple equilibria. Let a mean-zero Poisson process q i,t characterize the strategic uncertainty for firm i:
where λ i ∈ (0, 1) is the intensity, and a random variableε i ∈ R is the size of a jump, ε i,t ∈ R is the current level of q i,t , or the size of the previous jump. The term −ε i,t cancels the previous jump and makes the jump process stationary around zero. This is contrasted with the model of a level effect studied by Appelbaum and Lim (1985) and Vives (1989) .ε i can be drawn from any symmetric distribution, but for concreteness I assume U nif orm (−σ Crawford, 1995) , strategic uncertainty is assumed to be an increasing function of F j :
The project value for Firm i, denoted by V i,t , evolves as a jump-diffusion process:
. With a stopping time τ , the no-arbitrage value process for the investment opportunity C i,t is:
The firms simultaneously invest when both projects satisfy (6). This investment rule that includes the opportunity cost of discarding an option is contrasted with Tobin's q criterion under perfect competition (Abel et al., 1996) . The standard solution method is to divide the range of the underlying asset value into the continuation and stopping regions. By applying
Ito's lemma to C i,t in the continuation region, I obtain:
where E ε [•] is the expectation overε i . The expected return on C i,t equals the sum of the expected change in fundamental value (the first term) and the expected change due to strategic uncertainty (the second term). In Appendix A, I derive an analytical expression for C i,t by using the formula proposed by Gukhal (2001) . Although C i,t can be numerically analyzed, for the purpose of this study, it suffices to use the following standard properties of an American call option:
From (3) and (9), C i,t is increasing in F j . Eqs. (1), (4), and (8) imply that C i,t is nondecreasing in F i as demonstrated by Triantis and Hodder (1990) . Furthermore, it is natural to assume that marginal benefit of flexibility is diminishing but increasing in uncertainty:
In the team formation phase, a firm solves:
Note that and (11) . In the benchmark case in which σ s i is independent of F i , the necessary and sufficient condition that characterizes the optimal F * i would be:
This equation implicitly defines the reaction function of firm i,
Without strategic uncertainty, dC i,0 /dF i is equivalent to the direct effect ∂C i,0 /∂F i . In this case, the optinal F i is not influenced by Firm j's decision. By contrast, in the presence of strategic uncertainty, F i is shown to influences its own σ s i . I call this effect a strategic uncertainty effect. To see that the strategic uncertainty effect is positive, I first show that the choice of flexibility is a strategic complement. Proposition 1. When there is a strategic uncertainty, F i and F j are strategic complements.
That is, a more flexible strategy of firm i results in firm j's reacting with a more flexible strategy:
Proof. Firm j's choice of flexibility is determined by the optimality condition (13), where
If Firm i increases the degree of flexibility F i , Firm j faces larger σ S j from (3), and thus dC j,0 /dF j is larger for any F j by (12). Then, a larger value of F j satisfies (13); i.e., (14) is derived.
The next proposition shows that the strategic uncertainty effect is positive.
Proposition 2. The strategic uncertainty effect is positive. That is, a firm's increased degree of flexibility increases the uncertainty that the firm itself faces:
.
Proof. From (3), σ s i is strictly increasing in F j . From (14), ∂F j /∂F i is strictly positive at the optimum. Hence,
With the strategic uncertainty effect, the optimality condition for i becomes:
The reaction function is higher everywhere in (16) than in (13). In other words, a positive strategic uncertainty effect shifts the reaction function outward. To see this, note that the additional term
is positive from Eqs. (9) and (15). Then,
e., the terms in parentheses) is higher for any level of F i because there are two channels, through which F i positively affect C i,0 . On the other hand, ∂L i / ∂F i is increasing in F i . Thus, for any given level of F j , the optimal level of flexibility for firm i is higher with the strategic uncertainty effect than without. From this discussion, I obtain one of the main results of this study.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium degree of flexibility F * i for i = 1, 2 is higher when the strategic uncertainty effect exists.
Proof. With the strategic uncertainty effect, each firm must satisfy (16) at the optimum.
Therefore, the reaction curve of each firm is shifted outward as explained in the discussion above. Because the strategic complementarity (14) implies upward sloping reaction curves, an outward shift of a reaction curve results in a higher equilibrium level of flexibility for each firm. Fig. 2 depicts a symmetric case. F i (F j ) is the reaction function of firm i to the strategy of firm j. Non-decreasing reaction functions represent strategic complementarity in (14). With a positive strategic uncertainty effect (∂σ i /∂F i > 0), the reaction function shifts higher everywhere, and as a result, the equilibrium degree of flexibility F * i is higher. Proposition 4. Investment is delayed when there is a positive strategic uncertainty effect,
Proof. By Proposition 3, the equilibrium degree of flexibility is higher when there is an strategic uncertainty effect. The resulting level of uncertainty is higher for both firms. Therefore, the equilibrium value of investment opportunity C * i,t is higher for all t for two reasons. First, a higher equilibrium level of flexibility weakly increases the value of investment opportunity through the direct effect of (10). Second, a higher equilibrium level of flexibility increases uncertainty through the strategic uncertainty effect (15), and the greater uncertainty increases the value of the investment opportunity through (9). The firm requires a higher level of V i,t to make the investment. As a result, the investment is delayed under the strategic uncertainty effect.
Conclusion
Previous studies have shown that exogenous uncertainty makes agents want to maintain greater flexibility and delay investment. The innovation of this paper is to incorporate the reverse effect: the effect of flexibility on uncertainty. With the strategic uncertainty effect, the equilibrium degree of flexibility is even greater, and the investment is more delayed. This self-reinforcing effect is important because individually optimal decision-making results in stagnant economic activities.
This economics applies not only to investment decisions but also to a variety of joint projects that require the commitment of agents. An example is a multinational negotiation among international organizations when forming a joint multinational project. The model of the strategic uncertainty effect sheds light on this wide range of strategic activities.
Appendix A.
In this appendix, I present an analytical formula for the value of the investment opportunity C i,t after characterizing the value by a second-order partial differential equation. In (7), by retaining leading terms in dt, I obtain the second-order partial differential equation
If a jump takes the asset value into the stopping region, C V i,t +ε i in (A.1) is replaced by Π V i,t +ε i ; K m i . The problem is a free boundary problem with the following boundary conditions: respectively. The critical asset value X i,t that divides V i,t into S and C is obtained by solving
The sum of the two integral terms is called the early exercise premium. The first integral is the benefit from the stopped reduction in asset value (+µ m i V u ) less the cost of foregone interest (−rK m i ) in cases of early exercise. The second integral is another "cost" of early exercise that is associated with jumps from the stopping region back to the continuation region. Even if the asset value is in the stopping region and the option is exercised at time u − , subsequent Poisson jumps may bring the asset value back to the continuation region after the exercise. In that case, C u − Π (V u , q u ; K) becomes positive. The optimal exercise policy requires that the stopped reduction in asset value be greater than the combined cost of foregone interest and missed chances of continuation.
